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Abstract 
 
Recent debates advocate that closer sub-regional trade cooperation may be an excellent start to 
stronger regional cooperation. The study investigates this proposition for the case of CLMV 
countries that remain less integrated into the ASEAN region. In this respect, the China-CLMV 
bilateral trade flows are examined prior to detailing the role of China as a core trade partner to 
the periphery of CLMV in enhancing trade expansion within the context of intra-ASEAN regional 
and intra-GMS sub-regional synergies. The key findings of the study are: First, there are negative 
effects of China-CLMV trade collaboration, whereby the export potential particularly for 
agricultural products is clearly underexploited.  Second, China’ trade relations with CLMV 
indicate that import integration lags behind export integration. The Chinese import potential of 
CLMV’s manufactures in particular is underexploited, plausibly reflecting the inability of the 
latter to be part of the regional supply chain. Third, when China’s regional and sub-regional 
influence is considered along the dimensions of an export destination, there are positive gains for 
CLMV and the magnitude of those gains appear larger within the sub-regional context. Overall, 
the study points out that though the China-CLMV trade relations remain sub-optimal as it is 
unbalanced and underexploited, sub-regional membership of CLMV in the GMS is important as 
benefits can be derived from the Thailand-China synergy, geographical proximity and common 
border effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As the global economic recession weighs on trade, China seeks to further deepen her economic ties with the 
regional group of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).  In China‟s economic relations with ASEAN, 
trade occupies the most important position given China‟s unique potential to drive intra-regional trade (ADB, 
2009a).  The less developed countries of ASEAN, CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam), however have 
a much lower level of trade cooperation with China (Lwin, 2009) relative to the ASEAN6 (Malaysia, Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei), giving rise to a two-tiered level of trade integration for ASEAN.  
Amongst the notable imbalances in the China-CLMV trade are the high import dependence of CLMV on China 
resulting in overall trade deficits for the former (Kudo, 2007), low degree of participation of CLMV in the regional 
production networks (Kudo, 2007; 2009), complete industrial structure of China coupled with quality advantage of 
Chinese products over that of CLMV, low complementary structures between China and CLMV and the small 
export base
1
 of CLMV (Austria, 2004; Hao, 2007; ADB, 2007a; Zhao et al. 2008; Lwin, 2009).  As such, the 
average development gap between both parties has widened posing threats for further regional integration for 
CLMV (Chia, 2006; Sussangkarn, 2006; Poncet, 2006; Hao, 2007; Kimura and Obashi, 2009).  
 
Besides being the lesser effective members of ASEAN, the imbalances in China-CLMV trade also raises 
the stakes of CLMV to be bystanders in the overall process of regional integration, what more with the complete 
phasing-in of the ACFTA (ASEAN-China Free Trade Area) in 2010.  Trade integration of the “periphery” CLMV 
                                                          
1 For example, in 2006, the export product range for Cambodia was only 45 as opposed to 1,023 for Singapore (Kimura and 
Obashi, 2009). 
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countries with China (and ASEAN) is therefore critical.  The CLMV countries, within the context of the economic 
system
2
, however have another platform to enhance trade cooperation with China (more specifically the Yunnan 
Province), which is the GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-region)
3
 initiative.  This raises a question: Is sub-regionalism 
then a better idea to deepen China-CLMV relations, particularly in the medium term? 
 
While some opine that CLMV should be considered within the broader context of her trade relations with 
the other countries in the region (see also Poncet, 2006) and plausibly outside the region (see Tumbarello, 2007), 
progress in China-CLMV trade specifically has been noted within the sub-regional GMS cooperation. Some 
complementarities in China-CLMV trade have been realized recently
4
, implying potentials for a higher degree of 
trade integration (Poncet, 2006).  Arising from differences in factor endowments and price structures (Kudo, 2007b) 
in the rich agricultural GMS area, Yunnan‟s foreign trade with CLMV is largely based on border trade (Zhu, 2009). 
The share of LMV in total trade of Yunnan was 22 per cent in 2007 (Ishida, 2009). Following which, the plausible 
route for CLMV to increase trade integration with China may involve different modalities of economic cooperation 
under the auspices of GMS and ASEAN respectively based on type of trade and product mix.  Further, the China-
CLMV sub-regional cooperation may also be relevant to generating substantive intraregional trade
5
 (ADB, 2007c; 
2009), specifically in final demand for goods (instead of parts and components that characterize intra-Asian trade) 
within the region, necessary to minimize the risks of global downturns that weaken external demand.   
 
In this respect the paper examines China-CLMV bilateral trade flows for the period 1992-2008 using a 
modified gravity model (Mulapruk and Coxhead, 2005).  In examining China-CLMV trade flows, this paper also 
explores the role of the former as core trade partner to the periphery of CLMV in enhancing trade expansion within 
the context of intra-ASEAN and intra-GMS synergies. The basis for this, respectively, is that China has positioned 
itself at the core of the ASEAN region‟s production networks while she is an active participant (Zhu, 2008) within 
the GMS area with the strongest in comprehensive economic plan and records highest economic growth (Hao, 
2007). This places China in the lead position in regional and sub-regional cooperation over the long term (Hao, 
2007).  Specifically, the paper addresses the following two key questions: (1) Does the influence of China on CLMV 
differ from that of the ASEAN6? In trade with CLMV, does the influence of China differ across trade in agricultural 
commodities vis-à-vis manufactured products?  (2) Can China play a more catalytic role through bilateral trade with 
CLMV via ASEAN membership or the GMS area?  
 
WHY SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION?  
 
Proponents of regionalism consider it a building bloc towards multilateralism, and not a substitute to the 
latter.  The standard arguments for regionalism is that it is far simpler, efficient and provides for trade creation 
(Joongi, 2003) based on preferential treatment accorded to members of the agreement, whilst recent debates explain 
that regionalism in this region is not an economic domino effect but more specifically is best understood as being a 
„political domino‟ effect at work (Ravenhill, 2009). Though the debates on regionalism and its possible threats to 
multilateralism continue, regionalism in Asia remains here to stay.   
 
                                                          
2 In this paper, sub-regional is defined to comprise GMS members, whilst regional refers to AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area, 
born in 1992), conceived under the ASEAN (born in 1967) framework.  It should also be noted that the CLMV countries are 
latecomers to AFTA, with Vietnam‟s accession in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and finally Cambodia in 1999. 
3 The GMS programme, initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992, comprises CLMV, Thailand and the Yunnan 
Province of China. In 2005, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region joined the GMS. 
4 Though the GMS was inaugurated in 1992,  the impacts of the cooperation are still unfolding as the period 1992-1996 (First 
Stage) saw the creation of GMS principles, fact finding and project formation while the period 1994-2001 (Second Stage) was the 
implementation stage of the listed projects (Ishida, 2007).  
5 Apart from that, the extensive margin (newly exported products) is overwhelmingly large for latecomers with limited number of 
exported products and small value of exports.  Within the CLMV, the importance of extensive margin growth has been observed 
for Cambodia and Vietnam (Kimura and Obashi, 2009). 
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The leading regional trade agreement in Asia is AFTA. Intra-ASEAN trade has grown (albeit modest) but it 
cannot be explained by regionalism
6
, as the crux of AFTA is competitiveness (production based for multinationals 
and their value chains) of ASEAN countries in global trade and not the promotion of intra-ASEAN trade (see also 
Cuyvers et al., 2005; Pelkmans, 2009).  With the enlargement of the AFTA membership to include CLMV countries 
post mid-1990s, the group became even more diverse. Regionalism appeared more delusionary for ASEAN as a 
whole and the CLMV countries in particular as they remain less integrated (Gavin, 2006) with the bloc.  Ironically 
though, the export patterns of CLV
7
 countries imply that they [especially Cambodia, see Kagami, 2009; lesser extent 
Laos (Kagami, 2009; Lwin, 2009)] are more integrated with the global economic system instead of the region 
(Hoang and Liao, 2002; Chia, 2006; Sussangkarn, 2006).    
 
Therefore, to take full advantage of AFTA and the new ACFTA, CLMV needs to increase its trade 
momentum through other means (besides regionalism) and close the development gap with ASEAN6 and China.   
Can sub-regional cooperation then provide the means for CLMV to deal with integration issues at the regional level?  
 
The GMS represents sub-regional economic cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia, that is of market 
integration
8
 (ADB, 2004; Menon, 2005; unlike that of ASEAN which is institutional based), and therefore does not 
render itself inconsistent with regionalism in relation to CLMV‟s membership in AFTA or the ACFTA. The 
development of the GMS is considered specifically important to build closer China-CLMV relationship as the 
CLMV constitute 66 per cent of the total area of the Mekong basin.  Specifically, the focused initiatives (as 
discussed below) of the GMS allow for transformation of the economic geography of CLMV through improved 
connectivity and subsequently better trade opportunities with Yunnan.   Further, increasing direct integration with 
Yunnan via the GMS may provide the CLMV economies the avenue to further integrate with the other original 
ASEAN member economies (Menon, 2005; Sussangkarn, 2006), and with China as a whole.   
 
While intraregional trade of the GMS only represents 12 per cent of total trade compared to the rest of the 
world (Pham, 2007),  it has supposedly witnessed dynamic growth and is considered the most effective development 
scheme in the region (Ishida, 2007) and the fastest growing sub-region in the world (ADB, 2004, Aparna, 2007).  It 
has a combined population of 276 million (calculated from ADB, 2009) and is predominantly agrarian
9
 in nature 
(Zhu, 2008).  The dynamism of the sub-region is its strategic location and diversity, which provides opportunity to 
leverage economic complementarities. Specifically, differences in economic development and factor endowments 
between economies imply opportunities for exchanges
10
. At the extremes is Laos, the least developed of the GMS 
economies and Yunnan the most economically advanced (apart from Thailand, the most developed and largest 
market) of the GMS (ADB, 2004). Alternatively, countries like Myanmar and Laos can also tap on the China-
Thailand synergy as both the core economies have expressed strong intention to develop their mutual relationship 
through  the former (Tsuneishi, 2009). 
 
                                                          
6
 A vast majority of intra-ASEAN trade is conducted on a most-favoured nation (MFN) and not preferential tariffs 
(Cuyvers et al., 2005; Gavin, 2006; Ravenhill, 2009) and the bloc remains export-dependent on external markets.  
Thus intra-ASEAN trade has not occurred at the expense of extra-ASEAN trade (Tumbarello, 2007). Some studies even attest to 
the negligible and non trade-creating effects of AFTA [Soloaga and Winters, 2001; Clarete et al., 2002; Dee and Gali, 2003: cited 
from Tumbarello, (2007], notwithstanding other findings of a significant increase in intra-regional trade resulting from AFTA 
[Frankel and Wei, 1997; Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004; Gosh and Yamarik, 2004: cited from Tumbarello (2007)]. 
7 Myanmar is not included as her share of intra-ASEAN trade in total trade is now approximately 50 per cent of both exports and 
imports (Lwin, 2009).  Myanmar has shifted her trade focus to the neighbouring countries with the imposition of trade sanctions 
by the United States and European countries. However, it should be noted that in the recent past, the other GMS members have 
also increased their trade dependence on themselves (Fujimura, 2008).   
8 Market integration relies on non-official institutions that provide regional public and quasi-public goods, which reduce 
transaction costs associated with the international movement of goods, services and other production factors. 
9 However, there is growing diversification with the rise of commercialized agriculture and the expansion of labour intensive 
agro-processing activities (ADB, 2004, 2007b).  Further, some CLMV countries have shifted into labour intensive commodities 
(light consumer goods and resource based industries); the shift is palpable for Cambodia given her garment industry (ADB, 
2007c). 
10 Vietnam and Thailand are said to have a similar trade and industrial structure (Nguyen, 2002; Kagami, 2009), as the former‟s 
exports have gradually shifted from raw materials to light manufacturing, agricultural and aquacultural products. 
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The main thrust of the GMS is to improve the transport infrastructure (Ishida, 2005; Fujimura, 2008), 
which is also important to activate production networks and capture trickle down effects by CLMV [Kimura and 
Obashi, 2009; Kudo, 2009; see also Kimura and Kobayashi (2009) for results on the expected dispersion (sometimes 
known as linked agglomeration, when the agglomeration leaps out of the network to connect with remote places via 
an efficient logistic network) of activities from the core to the periphery of Cambodia with improvement in 
infrastructure and trade facilitation based on a Geographical Simulation Model], since intra-GMS exchanges are 
mainly that of border trade.  Border trade, is promoted through economic corridors (introduced in 1998) which 
include cross-border transportation agreement (CBTA, took effect in 2003) to facilitate the cross-border movement 
of vehicles and special economic zones
11
 (Ishida, 2007; Kudo, 2009) to improve the business environment. The 
initial corridors comprise East-West, North-South and Southern Economic corridors
12
, which connect major cities in 
the GMS area.   Thus, the economic corridors have provided additional transport option (roads) for companies to 
transport goods between China and ASEAN and within ASEAN (Ishida, 2009).  Further to transport infrastructure, 
the GMS also supports a range of „soft infrastructure‟ (other trade-related transaction costs) measures from 
improving procedures for customs clearance, increasing transparency and enhancing technical skills to improve the 
various regulatory systems (ADB, 2004; Menon, 2005; Strutt et al., 2008).  Strutt et al. (2008) show proof from their 
CGE simulations that reduction in trade time is essential to increase exports within the GMS area and provide 
opportunities for the diversification of exports.  
 
To some extent, the CLV countries have benefited from the sub-regional integration approach as they have 
shown greater linkages with China and Thailand
13
 (Hoang and Liao, 2002; Sussangkarn, 2006; Ishida, 2009; 
Tsuneishi, 2009).  An empirical study by Fujimura and Edmonds (2006) concludes that trade in major commodities 
within the GMS is positively influenced by the level of cross-border infrastructure (see also Fujimura, 2008). As 
such, the Chinese and Thai trade with CLMV had increased by 449 per cent and 371 per cent respectively between 
the 2000 and 2007 (Kagami, 2009).   For example, China has emerged as a major supplier of consumer and capital 
goods to Myanmar through border trade and subsequently provide the market for primary and agricultural products 
(Kudo, 2006). This is as expected given the aid contribution by China (see Kudo, 2006; Zhu, 2008) and the fact that 
CLM countries in particular require close proximity to promote their bilateral trade (Lwin, 2009).  Setting aside 
those perceived benefits are some shortcomings that prevail. 
 
Despite the flexible arrangements and potentials of the GSM area, the China-LMV border trade is still 
characterized by small-scale and limited varieties.  For example, small-scale border trade occupies 80 per cent and 
66 per cent of the Myanmar and Laos trade with Yunnan respectively (Ishida, 2009).  Following from this, recent 
statistics reveals that  the Yunnan Province has the smallest trade share with other GMS countries (Zhu, 2008) but 
the shares are considerably high for smaller economies such as Myanmar and Laos (ABD, 2007a).  Poncet‟s (2006) 
study confirms that though Yunnan has close and privileged trade relations with Laos and Myanmar, reflecting the 
success of the GMS initiative, Yunnan‟s export bias to Myanmar had declined steadily over the period 1988-1999.  
Further with the less diversified economies of the CLMV, the development of the economic corridors may tip the 
trade imbalances in favour of China (Kudo, 2006).  In addition to this, Kudo (2009) explains that the enhanced 
transport connectivity may also not be equally beneficial to the individual CLMV countries, citing Lao‟s neglected 
position in the East-West Economic Corridor with increased traffic flow between Bangkok and Hanoi.  
 
Apart from the CLMV perspective, Yunnan also faces her own challenges as pointed out by Zhu (2008).  
Amongst them is her weak economic strength, lack of coordination within the Province and competition pressure 
from inland and coastal areas. Other problems in the GMS cooperation relate to the policy framework such as the 
                                                          
11 As at November 2007, 18 special economic zones were approved by the Cambodian government, many of which are located in 
border areas (Kudo, 2009). 
12 New economic corridors have been added (i.e. Southern Coastal Sub Corridor, Northern Sub Corridor and New Route of the 
North-South Economic Corridor) while some parts of the North-South Corridor have changed (Ishida, 2007). 
13
 Lwin‟s (2009) study indicates that Cambodia and Myanmar have not reached their trade potential with Thailand whilst Laos 
and Myanmar have not reached their trade potential with China.   This however implies that trade within the GMS is yet to be 
exploited to the full potential. 
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CBTA.  The CBTA as pointed out by Ishida (2009) is yet to take effect in some borders for three reasons:  First, lack 
of dissemination of the documents to officials at border check points; Second, lack of coordination within the related 
ministries of the countries concerned; Third, contradictions between the CBTA and domestic regulations. 
 
 Though the GMS area is a right step in the direction to deepen CLMV‟s trade integration and some gains 
are already evident, the challenges that remain, if not adequately addressed, may stall the complete realization of the 
China-CLMV trade potentials and CLMV‟s integration at the sub-regional and regional levels.  
 
CLMV AND THE REGION: SUBOPTIMAL TRADE PATTERNS 
 
CLMV only represents a small total trade share of China-ASEAN trade (Table 1). The China-CLMV trade 
shares (particularly the shares of agricultural products in total imports of China from CLMV have grown 
substantially) are higher for primary and agricultural products relative to manufactures based on the latest data.   
This is not surprising as the agriculture sector accounts 32 per cent, 42 per cent, 44 per cent and 20 per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product of the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam respectively based on 2007 data (Lwin, 2009). As 
such, China has an overall trade surplus with CLMV (see also Kagami, 2009) though suffers deficits with ASEAN6 
(see also Hao, 2007), but in the case of primary and agricultural products, China records deficits even with CLMV.  
The unbalanced trade performance between China and CLMV is even more pronounced for Myanmar (Kudo, 2006).  
 
 
Table 1: CLMV Trade Statistics 
  Exports Imports Total Trade 
 Product 1992 2000 2008 1992 2000 2008 1992 2000 2008 
China-CLMV Trade Shares (% of China-ASEAN trade) 
All Products 8.76 12.86 16.19 2.31 2.84 2.25 6.81 8.49 10.25 
Manufactures 12.10 12.93 15.74 2.96 0.88 1.92 8.85 6.79 9.59 
Agricultural 3.82 12.53 21.30 5.71 13.77 10.91 4.96 13.41 13.21 
China-CLMV Trade Shares (% of China-GMS trade) 
All Products 32.02 49.89 54.34 32.86 20.36 16.83 32.30 33.60 36.51 
Manufactures 35.22 49.46 53.03 30.08 4.07 7.48 34.52 28.42 34.38 
Agricultural 22.47 52.19 68.43 33.72 43.79 38.69 29.25 45.81 45.77 
CLMV Trade Shares (% of intra-ASEAN trade) 
All Products 7.91 13.01 24.62 5.38 8.27 14.13 6.84 11.04 19.69 
Manufactures 7.40 9.57 21.16 0.75 3.01 7.62 4.78 6.97 15.36 
Agricultural 9.10 25.88 30.79 13.17 22.48 21.80 11.02 24.26 26.01 
CLMV Trade Shares (% of intra-GMS trade) 
All Products 25.35 33.70 41.94 21.04 17.61 14.27 23.71 25.81 29.43 
Manufactures 28.30 35.50 44.10 26.45 3.68 7.00 28.07 22.56 29.95 
Agricultural 17.05 26.87 29.76 19.91 35.65 26.89 18.94 32.73 27.85 
Note: The statistics on China-GMS and intra-GMS trade may underestimate the trade shares of China-CLMV as the 
          data is not Yunnan Province specific. 
Source: Calculated from UN COMTRADE. 
 
 
Amongst the CLMV, China‟s trade with Vietnam at USD11.8 million in 2008 is by far the largest.  
Bilateral trade grew by 1.34 per cent per annum between 1992 and 2008, and China has emerged as a leading trade 
partner of Vietnam (see also Do and Ha, 2009).  By product, China‟s exports to CLMV are mainly that of 
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machinery, iron and steel and textiles, whilst she imports raw materials from the latter (Poncet, 2006; ADB 2007a; 
Kagami, 2009), reflecting a vertical (inter-industry) type of trade expansion (Fujimura, 2008).  Since the CLMV (to 
a lesser extent Vietnam) countries are relatively import dependent on China, concessions were made by China in the 
agricultural sector under the Early Harvest Plan (EHP) to make it possible for CLMV to increase her exports to 
China (see also Gavin, 2006).  China further granted a special tariff program, comprising zero tariffs on specific 
products, to CLM.  These preferences however have yet to result in any marked increase of CLMV exports to China 
[Hao, 2007; Ravenhill (2009) cites that the provisions under the EHP yield limited results as it covered trade of a 
total value of less than USD1 million], though the former has a comparative advantage in agricultural products.  
 
 In the context of China-GMS trade, agricultural products again dominate China-CLMV relations 
particularly from the import side.  There is however a significant decline in the import share of manufactures from 
CLMV within the GMS area.  Conversely China has substantially increased her export shares of both agricultural 
and manufactures to CLMV between 1992 and 2008.  China-CLMV bilateral trade reflects better trade integration 
from the export relative to the import perspective.  In short, the China-CLMV trade relationship appears unbalanced 
(in favour of China) in the context of the ASEAN region and the GMS sub-region.  
 
CLMV‟s position is further examined in the context of regional and sub-regional trade shares. The 
CLMV‟s contribution to trade at the sub-regional GMS level though higher than that to the ASEAN region still does 
not dominate intra-GMS trade.  Despite the growing export shares of CLMV in intra-regional and intra-sub-regional 
trade, interestingly at the sub-regional level, the share of manufactures is at present larger than that for agriculture.  
However the opposite holds true when considering her intra-regional and intra-sub-regional import shares of 
manufactured products.  In fact, the CLMV share of imports of manufactures from within the GMS has declined 
sharply. 
 
 Summarizing the above patterns imply that China-CLMV trade is operating on a sub-optimal level given 
the small trade shares of CLMV relative to ASEAN6 and the lower level of trade integration from the import 
perspective. Further, apart from the regional contribution, the small trade shares of CLMV even within the sub-
regional level further signify her lack of dynamism. 
 
REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL INTERDEPENDENT ROLE OF CHINA 
 
Modified Gravity Model 
 
The gravity equation
14
 is employed for analyzing the evolution of China-ASEAN trade flows and the role 
of China in influencing CLMV trade at the regional (intra-ASEAN) level and the sub-regional (intra-GMS) levels. 
The first baseline set of estimations examine China‟s bilateral trade with the ten ASEAN countries.  To measure the 
impact of China‟s influence on CLMV, a dummy variable15 is introduced.  It takes the value of one if the partner is 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos or Vietnam.   To distinguish China-CLMV trade from that of China-ASEAN6, the trade 
flows are disaggregated between agricultural and manufactured products for CLMV and ASEAN6 respectively. A 
group of dummy variables are gain introduced for this purpose.  The China-ASEAN trade flows are estimated in 
log-linear form (except for the dummy variables)
16
: 
 
lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6DUMADJi,j  + β7DUMCLMVi,j+ εij                    (1) 
                                                          
14 Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) were the first authors applying the gravity equation to analyze international trade 
flows. Until the 1970s, theoretical support for this model remained weak.  Thereafter, various theories emerged to explain the 
model based on solid microeconomics foundation such as constant elasticity of substitution preferences and product 
differentiation  (Anderson, 1979), monopolistic competition and the Hecksher-Ohlin model of inter-industry trade (Bergstrand, 
1985, 1989) and increasing returns to scale (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
15 The interpretation of the dummy variable for specific partners is as follows (Poncet, 2006): A positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for a dummy variable implies that trade flows exceed the normal level; that is the level predicted by the 
countries‟ economic sizes and the distance between them.  Conversely, a negative and statistically significant coefficient implies 
that the trade flows fall short of the predicted level.  
16 Since the equations are linear in logarithms, the estimated coefficients of the continuous variables are elasticities. 
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lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6ADJi,j  + β7DUMCLMVAGRI i,j+                        (2)    
            β8DUMASEAN6AGRI i,j +  εij                     
 
lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6ADJi,j  + β7DUMCLMVMANU i,j+                      (3)     
            β8DUMASEAN6MANU i,j +  εij                     
 
where subscripts i and j refer to the exporting and the partner (importing) country respectively.  The other variables 
are defined below: 
 
X
17
 = bilateral exports between i and j. X is alternated with M (bilateral imports between i and j). 
GDP = real gross domestic product (GDP). The variable GDPi is alternated with GDPi,t-1 (a one-year lag) for 
equations (1) and (2) to address endogenous determination of current trade levels and current GDP (see Edmonds et 
al., 2008). 
 
N = population. The variable N is alternated with PGDP (GDP per capita). 
ADJ = common border between i and j (dummy variable equal to one if i and j share a border and 0 otherwise) 
DST = distance between economic centres of i and j 
DUMCLMV = dummy variable equal to one if the partner country is CLMV and 0 otherwise 
DUMCLMVAGRI = dummy variable equal to one if it is agricultural trade with CLMV and 0 otherwise 
DUMASEAN6AGRI = dummy variable equal to one if it is agricultural trade with ASEAN6 and 0 otherwise 
DUMCLMVMANU = dummy variable equal to one if it is manufactures trade with CLMV and 0 otherwise 
DUMASEAN6MANU = dummy variable equal to one if it is manufactures trade with ASEAN6 and 0 otherwise 
 
ε = error term that picks up other influences on bilateral trade 
α = constant term 
 
The second set of estimations illustrates China‟s influence on CLMV through intra-regional trade and intra-
sub-regional trade flows. A dummy variable (DUMCLMV) is introduced to separately identify the ASEAN6-CLMV 
trade flows from that of intra-ASEAN6 in the regional context.  For the sub-regional perspective, DUMCLMV 
distinguishes ASEAN6-CLMV trade flows from that of intra-CLMV.  The basic equation is augmented (see 
Mulapruk and Coxhead, 2005) and the following are estimated for intra-ASEAN and intra-GMS
18
 (excluding 
China‟s bilateral trade with other GMS members) trade flows: 
  
lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6DUMADJi,j  + β7lnXi,CHINA +                               (4) 
            β8lnXCHINA,j + εij 
 
lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6DUMADJi,j + β7lnXi,CHINA*DUMCLMV +         (5) 
            β8lnXCHINA,j*DUMCLMV + εij 
 
lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6DUMADJi,j   +                                                     (6) 
            β7lnXi,CHINA*DUMCLMVnett + β8lnXCHINA,j*DUMCLMVnett + εij 
 
Finally, the intra-GMS (including China‟s bilateral trade with other GMS members) trade flows are estimated as 
follows:  
 
lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6DUMADJi,j                                                                                         (7) 
lnXi,j = α + β1lnGDPi + β2lnGDPj + β3lnNi + β4lnNj + β5lnDSTi,j+ β6DUMADJi,j  + β7DUMChina-CLMV                                 (8) 
                                                          
17 Exports and imports are used as the dependent variable, rather than total bilateral trade because it permits to identify export and 
import diversion separately (Tumbarello, 2007) and is a more direct performance indicator for trade reforms. However, the 
gravity model is reported to perform consistently better with export data than with import data as  the former is reported fob 
(freight on board) with the latter includes cif (cost, insurance and freight) (Fitzpatrick, 1984). 
18 The study employs trade data of China for intra-GMS instead of the Yunnan Province given the lack of Provincial level 
statistics. 
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where 
Xi,CHINA = exports of country i to China 
XCHINA,j = exports of China to country j 
 
DUMCLMV = dummy variable equal to one for ASEAN6-CLMV and intra-CLMV bilateral pairs and 0 otherwise 
for the regional case. For the sub-regional context, dummy variable equal to one for Thailand-CLMV and 0 
otherwise. 
DUMCLMVnett = dummy variable equal to one for ASEAN6-CLMV and 0 otherwise (including intra-CLMV trade) 
for the regional case.  For the sub-regional context, dummy variable equal to one for intra-CLMV trade and 0 
otherwise.  
DUMChina-CLMV = dummy variable equal to one if the bilateral pair is China-CLMV and 0 otherwise 
all other variables are as defined above. 
 
The GDP, PGDP, N, DST and ADJ are standard arguments of the gravity model.  The GDP variable is a 
proxy for country size (market size and production/ trading capacity; see Tinbergen, 1962; Poyhonen, 1963).  The 
postulated signs for β1 and β2 are positive since a large country is more likely to achieve economies of scale, 
increase exports and simultaneously possess the capacity to absorb imports. All equations use N and PGDP
19
 
interchangeably.  Generally, the coefficient on N is expected to bear a negative sign as a large country is considered 
to be less open to trade.  Further explanations for this is that a country with a large population implies a large 
domestic market and a more diversified range of output that would result in less dependence on international 
specialization.  Conversely, a country with large population may be able to capture economies of scale in production 
and therefore trade more.  Hence the expected sign of the coefficient on N is ambiguous (Brada and Mendez, 1983; 
Garman and Gilliard, 1998; Cheng and Wall, 2005). PGDP
20
 measures the income level and/ or purchasing power of 
a country and is expected to relate positively with bilateral trade volumes.  Broadly speaking, PGDP also captures 
better trade-related infrastructure and trade facilitation measures.   
 
 Though DIST is no longer an issue with technological advancement, geographical distance remains 
important for considerations of transport costs, transaction costs (Bergstrand, 1985; Edmonds et al., 2008) and 
timeliness in delivery (see also Rojid, 2006; Athukorala, 2008) and is included in the estimations.  Similarly ADJ 
captures additional advantages of proximity.  Thus the expectations are for β5 < 0 (Tinbergen, 1962; Poyhonen, 
1963) and β6 > 0.   
 
The most important explanatory variables for the second set of estimations on intra-regional and intra-sub-
regional trade flow is Xi,CHINA*DUMCLMV (and Xi,CHINA*DUMCLMVnett) and Xi,CHINA*DUMCLMV (and 
XCHINA,j*DUMCLMVnett). Following a similar reasoning of that of Mulapruk and Coxhead (2005), but with a 
different interpretation, the study considers the partner country j as ASEAN member countries themselves and not 
third markets outside ASEAN.  The inclusion of these variables  in the study therefore capture the role of China in 
influencing CLMV trade via two confounding effects of an (a) expansion in export supply to China by the exporting 
country i; and (b) expansion in import sourcing from China by the importing country j. If an increase in exports from 
i to China crowds out exports from i to j, then β7 < 0.  However, if an increase in exports from i to China promote 
exports from i to j, then β7 > 0.  The variable XCHINA,j in turn indirectly measures the comparative advantage between 
China and i through the exports of the former to j.  If China has a comparative advantage over i, then exports from 
China to j will bear a negative impact on exports from i to j and β8 < 0. Conversely, β8 = 0 when country i possesses 
a comparative advantage over China. 
 
For a detailed description of the construction of variables and the various data sources, see Appendix 1. The 
above estimations are conducted in a panel setting for the bilateral trade flows as listed in Appendix 2 spanning the 
                                                          
19 The specification with PGDP is often used to estimate aggregate exports whereas that which includes N is often used to 
estimate bilateral exports for specific sectors (Martinez and Nowak, 2003).  
20 All specifications are also estimated using PGDP and N (apart from the combination of GDP with PDGP and GDP and N). 
Breuss and Egger (1997) point out that using PGDP instead of absolute GDP avoids high co-linearity often present between 
absolute GDP and N (see also Garman and Gilliard, 1998, Smith, 1999; Sandberg et al., 2006). 
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period 1992 - 2008.  There is missing data
21
 for some bilateral pairs and the study does deal with zero trade values in 
logs by using ln(1+ Xij) for some bilateral pairs.  The analysis is conducted for the full sample of aggregate exports 
[agriculture (SITC 0-4) and manufactures (SITC 5-8)] and aggregate imports (for the baseline estimations only).  
 
Does Sub-Regional Membership Matter for CLMV? 
 
Table 2 reports the regression estimates
22
 for China-ASEAN trade flows. For all specifications, the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) tests indicate that the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Random Effects 
(RE)
23
 model is more appropriate than the ordinary least squares (OLS, pooled model). The two basic explanatory 
variables (GDP and N)
24
 in terms of exports in Table 2 have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level.  From the import perspective, only the population size of the partner country matters for China. 
However, distance and border are not significant for all specifications.   
 
 For equation (1), the coefficients for DUMCLMV are negative and significant (albeit weak) for both export 
and import flows.  This illustrates negative effects of China-CLMV collaboration.  China‟s exports to CLMV is 
significantly lower than the normal level at 13 per cent [exp(-2.018) = 0.13] whilst her imports from the latter is 5 
per cent lower than the normal.  The export and import potentials are clearly underexploited in the China-CLMV 
case.  The Chinese exports of agricultural trade to CLMV are also underexploited given her deficits in agricultural 
trade with the latter (as discussed in the previous section). This is however less of an issue when compared to 
agricultural exports to ASEAN6.  China‟s exports of agricultural products to CLMV are only 6 per cent lower than 
the normal level relative to that of ASEAN6 at 25 per cent.  The opposite holds true in the case of China‟s exports of 
manufactures to CLMV and ASEAN6.  The results indicate positive effects of export collaboration between China 
and ASEAN, at 4.8 times and 8.7 times greater than the normal level for CLMV and ASEAN6 respectively.  
Conversely, China‟s imports of manufactures are significantly lower than the normal level at 11 per cent.  
 
 
Table 2: Gravity Equation Estimates for China-ASEAN Trade Flows 
  Dependent Variable: lnXij Dependent Variable: lnMij 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
lnGDPi 0.599*** 0.597*** 0.597*** 0.836 0.831 0.833 
 
0.204 0.205 0.205 1.008 1.013 1.011 
   
  
   lnGDPj 0.106** 0.122*** 0.124** 0.166 0.286 0.245 
 
0.046 0.046 0.046 0.221 0.214 0.212 
   
  
   lnNi 7.401** 7.311** 7.296** 12.114 11.555 11.755 
 
3.011 3.022 3.026 13.896 13.968 13.94 
   
  
   lnNj 0.681*** 0.683*** 0.687*** 1.360*** 1.320*** 1.331*** 
 
0.171 0.131 0.134 0.279 0.28 0.272 
                                                          
21 Where possible, the partner country records are used. The missing values for intra-CLMV trade particularly poses challenges 
for the estimation and thus the results should be interpreted with caution. 
22 Given the macroeconomic nature of the dataset, the issue of non-stationarity is also considered.  The unit root panel test on the 
levels and first differences are investigated using the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) test.  The IPS is chosen since it allows for 
a higher degree of heterogeneity in cross-section dynamics and also has a higher power than the Levin and Lin (LL) test.  The 
results confirm that the null of a unit root is rejected for most variables in levels.  Thus, most variables are found to be of I(0) 
process, which is stationary in levels.    
23 The RE model is chosen since the distance variable (lnDSTi,j) and contiguity (DUMADJi.j) are invariant across time periods.   
24 The results are robust to the use of various specifications (combinations of GDP and N; GDP and PGDP; PGDP and N), thus 
the results are reported only for the GDP and N combination. 
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   lnDST 1.147 1.688 1.852 2.051 2.945 2.532 
 
1.846 1.34 1.375 2.606 2.58 2.495 
   
  
   DUMADJ 0.863 -0.090 -0.360 1.112 -0.933 -0.058 
 
1.216 0.74 0.76 1.726 1.393 1.345 
   
  
   DUMCLMV -2.018* - - -2.920* - - 
 
1.129 
 
  1.643 
  
   
  
   DUMCLMVAGRI - -2.738*** - - 0.614 - 
  
0.687   
 
1.298 
 
   
  
   DUMASEAN6AGRI - -1.378** - - 0.724 - 
  
0.577   
 
1.087 
 
   
  
   DUMCLMVMANU - - 1.560** - - -2.217* 
   
0.705 
  
1.253 
   
  
   DUMASEAN6MANU - - 2.164*** - - 0.344 
   
0.592 
  
1.05 
No. of observations 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 
R
2 
overall 0.567 0.707 0.693 0.556 0.544 0.567 
Breusch-Pagan test (P value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: 1. The above estimations are based on the GLS random effects model, corrected for AR1disturbances. 
          2. Statistical significance is denoted as ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
 
 
 The results imply that China-CLMV trade integration is non-effective. Trade integration in terms of 
China‟s exports to CLMV appears more successful for manufactures vis-à-vis agriculture products, consistent with 
the industrial development of the former relative to the latter.  The Chinese import potential of CLMV‟s 
manufactures that is underexploited plausibly reflects the inability of CLMV to be part of the regional supply chain 
vis-à-vis ASEAN6.  Further, China‟s agricultural imports from CLMV are yet to yield significant positive effects 
from trade collaboration.  Overall, China‟ relations with CLMV indicate that import integration lags behind export 
integration. 
 
To scrutinize further China‟s integration with CLMV, the influence of the former on the latter is examined 
in the regional and sub-regional context, as shown in Table 3. From the regional perspective, the coefficients of 
exports from i to China are positive and significant, suggesting that an increase in exports from a member country of 
ASEAN (i) to China does not crowd out intra-regional exports between ASEAN countries (i to j). Instead, the results 
imply that China‟s integration in the region increases the size of the ASEAN member economies export market, 
consistent with newer theories of international trade which emphasize the important effect of economies of scale.  
The coefficient for lnXChina,j though negative is insignificant.  There is therefore no indication that import sourcing 
from China by ASEAN countries reduces export expansion within the latter.  The results accord with the fact that 
though China has become an important export destination and an import source for individual ASEAN countries, 
this has not reduced intra-regional trade.   
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When China‟s regional influence on CLMV specifically is further considered along the dimensions of an 
export destination, the variable of concern (Xi,China*DUMCLMV) in equation (5a) of Table 3 consistently indicate 
that an increase in exports from a member country of ASEAN6 (i) to China does not crowd out exports between 
ASEAN6 and CLMV countries or intra-CLMV exports (i to j).  Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
smaller implying less of an export expansion of ASEAN6 with CLMV following an increase in exports of the 
former to China. Instead, import sourcing from China by CLMV reduces export expansion within the latter and with 
ASEAN6. Similar results are obtained when intra-CLMV flows are not considered [equation (6a)].  This implies that 
China has a comparative advantage over ASEAN6 and CLMV and there could be some form of trade diversion from 
sourcing of imports within the region to that from China. 
 
 The above results on China‟s regional influence are compared with the case of her sub-regional influence 
on CLMV. In the sub-regional context, again export expansion between any GMS member with China increases 
exports within the member economies. The larger magnitude of the coefficient implies a more catalytic role for 
China along the dimension of an export destination within the GMS area.  However the export expansionary effects 
with China are not significant in boosting specifically Thailand-CLMV or intra-CLMV exports.  This implies the 
importance of Thailand-China direct synergies to increase the export market size of the other GMS economies. 
Unlike the regional context however, there is no significant diversion of trade from Thailand or CLMV following 
import sourcing by individual CLMV countries within the sub-region.  More importantly, it is only in the case for 
intra-GMS that distance and common border
25
 significantly matter for intra-sub-regional trade flows. Without the 
inclusion of China, common border facilitates trade and with the inclusion of China, geographical distance is a 
barrier for intra-GMS trade. Thus, the membership of CLMV in GMS does matter to the former. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The China-CLMV relations have indeed come a long way to establish a strategic trade partnership within 
the GMS, Though, closer sub-regional trade cooperation may be an excellent start to stronger regional cooperation 
(ADB, 2004, 2007c; Menon, 2005; Chia, 2006), the China-CLMV trade cooperation efforts remain unbalanced and 
underexploited. The theoretical arguments of the paper drawn from the potentials of sub-regional cooperation and 
the estimation approach based on an augmented gravity model brings to fore the following message. China-CLMV 
trade relations have yet to reach their full potential. This is noted even within the context of the GMS sub-regional 
cooperation. Nevertheless, the GMS area remains promising on the following accounts: (a) The Thailand-China 
synergies are important for other members of the GMS area; (b) Geographical proximity and common border are 
trade facilitators within the GMS area.  
 
 
Table 3: Gravity Equation Estimates for Intra-Regional and Intra-Sub-Regional Trade Flows 
  
Intra-Regional (Intra-
ASEAN) Intra-Sub-Regional (Intra-GMS) 
Variable (4) (5a) (6a) (4) (5b) (6b) (7) (8) 
lnGDPi 
1.468**
* 
1.744**
* 
2.323**
* 1.498** 0.208 0.608 0.798 0.762 
 
0.370 0.336 0.336 0.564 0.667     0.687 0.567 0.586 
   
    
 
  
  lnGDPj 0.403** 0.344** 0.473** -0.427 0.444 0.516 -0.030 -0.023 
 
0.175 0.175 0.179 0.517 0.503     0.515 0.349 0.351 
   
    
 
  
  
lnNi 0.501* 0.355 0.434 -1.662 
 
7.302*** 
   
6.699** 
 
3.591**
4.075
* 
                                                          
25 The differing results on distance and common border effects for intra-GMS trade flows with and without the inclusion of China 
may plausibly be attributed to the fact that Thailand shares the border with CLM while China with LM (Yunnan borders LMV). 
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* 
 
0.264 0.280 0.316 2.339 2.309 2.717 1.168 2.273 
   
    
 
  
  
lnNj 0.170 
0.874**
* 0.132 2.389* -0.708 -0.576 1.903** 
1.797
* 
 
0.254 0.285 0.278 1.419 1.523 1.560 0.930 1.028 
   
    
 
  
  
lnDST -0.527 -1.548 -0.164 2.486 18.436** 19.164** 
-
6.364**
* -4.884 
 
1.060 1.155 1.203 7.781 7.812 8.067 2.264 6.409 
   
    
 
  
  
DUMADJ 1.612 0.267 1.643 5.734** 
10.137**
* 
10.874**
* 0.311 0.770 
 
1.302 1.423 1.501 2.811 2.710 2.771 1.953 2.702 
   
    
 
  
  
lnXi,China 
1.001**
* - - 
2.058**
* - - - - 
 
0.184 
 
  0.400 
 
  
  
   
    
 
  
  lnXChina,j -0.127 - - -0.313 - - - - 
 
0.190 
 
  0.625 
 
  
  
   
    
 
  
  
lnXi,China*DUMCLMV - 
0.800**
* - - 0.593 - - - 
  
0.168     0.570   
  
   
    
 
  
  
lnXChina,j*DUMCLMV - 
-
1.069**
* - - -0.244 - - - 
  
0.186     0.623   
  
   
    
 
  
  lnXi,China*DUMCLMVn
ett - - 0.481** - - 0.110 - - 
   
0.243 
  
0.440 
  
   
  
  
  
  lnXChina,j*DUMCLMVn
ett - - 
-
0.524** - - -0.489 - - 
   
0.268 
  
0.430 
  
   
  
  
  
  DUMChina-CLMV 
  
  
  
  - -3.636 
   
  
  
  
 
14.70
1 
No. of observations 748 748 748 153 153 153 238 238 
Groups 44 44 44 9 9 9 14 14 
R
2 
overall 0.620 0.613 0.556 0.598 0.653 0.595 0.553 0.555 
Breusch-Pagan test (p- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.424 0.653 0.684 0.000 0.000 
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value) 
Note: 1. The above estimations are based on the GLS random effects model, corrected for AR1disturbances (except   
              for equations (4), (5b) and (6b) in column 2). 
          2. Statistical significance is denoted as ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Construction and Data Source 
Variable Variable Construction Data Source 
   
X Value of bilateral exports in US$ measured at 
constant (1990) price. 
Exports (at fob price, US$) compiled from UN 
COMTRADE  
 Exports are deflated by the US consumer price 
index. 
database. 
   
GDP Real GDP (at 1990 price). International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 GDP is deflated by the US consumer price index. Asian Development Bank. 
   
PGDP Real GDP per capita (at 1990 price). International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 Real GDP divided by population. Asian Development Bank. 
   
N Population. International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Asian Development Bank. 
   
DST Bilateral great-circle distance between major cities 
of each country. 
CEPII database. 
   
ADJ A binary dummy variable which takes the value 1 
for countries  
CEPII database. 
 which share a common land border and 0 otherwise.  
   
RER RERij = NER * (Pj/Pi) International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 where NER = nominal bilateral exchange rate index  
             Pj = price level of country j proxied by the 
producer price  
 
                     index  
             Pi = price level of country i proxied by the 
GDP deflator 
 
 RER is at 2000 price.  
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Appendix 2: Bilateral Country Pairs 
China-ASEAN  Intra-ASEAN Intra-GMS 
China-ASEAN6 Intra-ASEAN6 Intra-CLMV 
China-Malaysia Malaysia-Singapore          Cambodia-Laos 
China-Singapore Malaysia-Thailand           Cambodia-Myanmar 
China-Thailand Malaysia-Philippines         Cambodia-Vietnam  
China-Philippines Malaysia-Indonesia            Laos-Myanmar 
China-Indonesia Malaysia-Brunei Laos-Vietnam 
China-Brunei Philippines-Singapore Myanmar-Vietnam 
 
Thailand-Singapore   
China-CLMV Thailand-Philippines ASEAN6-CLMV 
China-Cambodia Thailand-Indonesia Thailand-Cambodia 
China-Laos Thailand-Brunei Thailand-Laos 
China-Myanmar Philippines-Indonesia Thailand-Myanmar 
China-Vietnam Philippines-Brunei Thailand-Vietnam 
  Indonesia-Singapore              
  Singapore-Brunei             China-CLMV 
  Indonesia-Brunei China-Cambodia 
    China-Laos 
  ASEAN6-CLMV China-Myanmar 
  Malaysia-Cambodia        China-Vietnam 
  Malaysia-Laos                 China-Thailand 
  Malaysia-Myanmar           
  Malaysia-Vietnam             
  Singapore-Cambodia         
  Singapore-Laos   
  Singapore-Myanmar   
  Singapore-Vietnam   
  Thailand-Cambodia   
  Thailand-Laos   
  Thailand-Myanmar   
  Thailand-Vietnam   
  Philippines-Laos   
  Philippines-Myanmar   
  Philippines-Vietnam   
  Indonesia-Cambodia   
  Indonesia-Laos   
  Indonesia-Myanmar   
  Indonesia-Vietnam   
  Philippines-Cambodia   
  Brunei-Cambodia   
  Brunei-Laos   
  Brunei-Myanmar   
  Brunei-Vietnam   
Note: There is missing data for 12 bilateral pairs (in italics): (a) Intra-ASEAN6: Indonesia-Brunei; (b) ASEAN6- 
          CLMV: Philippines-Cambodia; Brunei-Cambodia; Brunei-Laos; Brunei-Myanmar; Brunei-Vietnam.  
          (c) Intra-CLMV: Cambodia-Laos; Cambodia-Myanmar; Cambodia-Vietnam; Laos-Myanmar (no data); Laos- 
          Vietnam; Myanmar-Vietnam. 
